Information technology, and the low cost communications it enables, is almost certainly the most fundamental change in the mechanisms of politics at the international level. It has created a rich new set of both actors and interactions. This explosion of interconnectivity and the number of players has created the possibility for a network-like structure for international discourse. This structure contrasts sharply with the more hierarchical structure that previously constrained interactions. It provides access for small groups that had no influence in the past. Also, by connecting multiple levels of interactions, it facilitates the complex governance arrangements* developing in Europe (such as the EU and NATO). Both the access and the complex governance arrangements are important new features of international politics. These features increase the number of organizations with which nation-states can and must deal on international issues.
This network like system also makes it possible for information from nearly any player to [1](1. reach 2. exclude 3. extend) almost anyone else within the system. As a result, television broadcasts, fax machines, and the Internet have all had a role in the fall of the Berlin Wall, the economic reforms in China, and the recent crises in the Balkans. Non governmental organizations have been empowered by the ability to communicate with supporters and governments. This technology has also [2](1. prohibited 2. regulated 3. allowed) unofficial alliances and informal partnerships to rapidly form and dissolve over specific issues, amplifying the reaction to events. The resulting rate of change will challenge the ability of institutions that move at a more bureaucratic pace, like formal alliances, to respond in appropriate ways. This change will also test consensus formation in democracies.
The consequences of technological change fall into two major categories: firstly, an increasing need to rely on scientific and technical knowledge in choosing policies; secondly, a need to address the uncertainty that scientific and technical change bring about in policy formation.
Advances in science change what we know (or believe we know) about our surroundings. [3](1. Such as 2. As such 3. Such that), they would seem to have only a limited effect on international relations. The experience of the past few decades, however, demonstrates that science is uncovering issues of consequence to the entire globe, [4](1. and 2. not 3. for) just one country or region. Global warming, the potential disruption of oceanic climate patterns, and damage to the ozone layer are [5](1. but 2. except 3. not) a few examples. This adds a new degree of complexity to international relations. Increasingly, the modern world faces issues that are beyond our ability to understand through conventional experience. They require scientific expertise to collect and interpret data, build and use simulation models, and [6](1. take 2. do 3. make) the judgements necessary for policy choices.
We have faced similar problems before; nuclear conflict is a prime example. To a larger extent than [7](1.like 2. long 3.ever) before, the process of problem identification and policy response at the international level must be developed based on the scientific merits of the arguments. This requires policymakers to rely on scientific expertise to a much greater extent than before. The scientific community, with its concern that its freedom of inquiry will be restrained if lines of investigation are determined by policy needs, is often constrained by its own disciplines on broad ranging issues. The policy community, with its need for clear and sometimes overly [8](1. lengthy 2. complex 3. simple) explanations, is often limited by its understanding of scientific matters. While this is changing, neither group is currently well suited to work with the other to shape policy at the international level.
The adaptation necessary to continue stable economic growth, [9](1. address 2. refer 3. speak) global environmental problems, or prevent conflict while preserving national interests will be a challenge of the first [10](1. order 2. color 3. line). But, the problem is compounded by the growing pace of change in Science and technology, the unpredictable source of that change, and the uncertain nature of the advance. This makes our usual approaches to formulating policy and strategy more likely to produce results that are either ineffective due to changing circumstances or harmful due to unintended consequences.
We usually choose strategies or policies that are in some sense “best” for example, the most cost effective — for the envisioned future. These choices may not serve us well when scientific or technological advances change the [11](1. ground 2. Surface 3. underground) rules. One approach to managing this problem is to regard more carefully the range of possible future scenarios rather than focusing on the few we believe to be more likely. We often use this approach as individuals but rely on it less frequently in choices of international policy. When we step out in the morning, we take the weather forecast with skepticism. For example, we consider it quite likely that we will be faced with other scenarios despite a prediction of fair weather we might carry an umbrella, [12](1.by all means 2. just in case 3. this being so). Choosing robust strategies — ones that can accommodate the futures wide range of possibilities — has the potential for fewer regrets.
This shift away from “best” strategies to “robust” strategies will require a different approach both by the public and by policymakers. Currently a policy structured to adapt to changes in the international arena is often [13](1. esteemed 2. viewed 3. referred) as “ill-defined” or “no policy at all.” Yet these approaches — adaptive strategies that can deal with alternative futures — are some of the key tools we use as individuals to cope with uncertainty in everyday life — as illustrated by the umbrella.
That we may be overly reliant on “best” choices is, [14](1. to the contrary 2. to be sure 3. by no means), a matter of degree. We do make use of multiple scenarios in our thinking. Nevertheless, it will be hard to better manage the uncertainty that results from advances in science and technology, not only because we are less practiced at such thinking, but because we demand more of the policies themselves. Policies to achieve greenhouse gas reductions by encouraging technological innovation are more difficult to [15](1. refuse 2. evade 3. define) than a policy that only considers our current capabilities due to the belief that technological change is too uncertain to plan for.
Additional obstacles exist. Other challenges include distinguishing between insufficiently defined policy approaches and adaptive approaches, and accurately judging how much is enough when designing initiatives that can deal with [16](1. which 2. what 3. that) are seemingly unlikely alternative futures. It is even more difficult to build the public and international consensus necessary to implement policies that are more complex and difficult to explain. [17](1. Therefore 2. Nonetheless 3. All the more), recently completed analysis on global climate change indicates that it is possible to formulate adaptive strategies and to demonstrate their suitability for problems of an international scope. Other work on national security strategy suggests that strategies that can deal with a variety of futures are both practical and affordable.
Advances in science and technology may fundamentally change the “way the world works” in surprising and unanticipated ways. They have the potential to [18](1. reproduce 2. redefine 3. refuse) the actors on the international stage and to change the objectives of those actors in dealing with others. They can also affect commerce, conflict, and international politics. Increasing economic instability and the rapid creation of wealthy multilateral corporations are possible consequences. A shift in the nature of warfare to more hidden and secret [19](1. forms 2. formalities 3. fortress) of conflict and a decrease in the influence and sovereignty of the nation-state are also possible. In the face of such [20](1. peripheral 2. fundamental 3. misdirected) changes, we need to find ways to regard more carefully the range of possible changes and choose policies and strategies that work, despite advances in Science and technology.
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