My students seem to be very concerned — and also very divided — on how to approach the difficult subject of human rights in nonwestern societies. Is it right, the question is often asked, that nonwestern societies should be encouraged and pressed to conform to “Western values of liberty and freedom?” Is this not cultural imperialism? The notion of human rights [1](1. builds 2. reflects 3. dwells) on the idea of a shared community. These rights are not derived from citizenship of any country, or membership of any nation, but taken as entitlements of every human being. The concept of universal human rights is, in this sense, a uniting idea. Yet the subject of human rights has ended up being a very real battleground of political debates and ethical disputes, particularly in their application to nonwestern societies. Why so?
The explanation for this is sometimes sought in the cultural differences that allegedly divide the world, a theory referred to as the “clash of civilizations” or a “battle between cultures.” It is often asserted that Western countries recognize many human rights, related for example to political liberty, that have no great appeal in Asian countries. Many people see a big divide [2](1. line 2. here 3. created). The temptation to think in these regional and cultural terms is extremely strong in the contemporary world.
Are there really such [3](1. great mysteries 2. good terms 3. firm differences) on this subject in terms of traditions and cultures across the world ? It is certainly true that governmental spokesmen in several Asian countries have not only disputed the relevance and importance of universal human rights, but they have also frequently done this disputing in the name of “Asian values,” in contrast to Western values. The claim is that in the system of so-called Asian values, for example in the Confucian system, there is greater emphasis on order and discipline, and [4](1. less 2. fewer 3. than) on rights and freedoms.
Many Asian spokesmen have gone on to argue that the call for universal acceptance of human rights reflects the imposition of Western values on other cultures. For example, the censorship of the press may be more [5](1. restricted 2. benevolent 3. acceptable), it is argued, in Asian society because of its greater emphasis on discipline and order. This position was powerfully expressed by a number of governmental spokesmen from Asia at the Vienna Conference on Human Rights in 1993.
If one influence in separating out human rights as specifically “Western” comes from the [6](1. pleading 2. denying 3. escaping) of governmental spokesmen from Asia, then another influence relates to the way this issue is perceived in the West itself. There is a tendency in Europe and the United States to assume that it is in the West — and only in the West — that human rights have been valued from ancient times. This allegedly unique feature of Western civilization has been, it is assumed, an alien concept [7](1. everywhere 2. anywhere 3. elsewhere). By stressing regional and cultural specificities, these Western theories of the origin of human rights tend to reinforce the questioning of the concept of universal human rights in nonwestern societies. By arguing that the valuing of toleration, of personal liberty, and of civil rights is a particular contribution of Western civilization, Western advocates of these rights often give an ironic support to the nonwestern critics of human rights. The advocacy of an allegedly “alien” idea in non-Western societies can indeed look like cultural imperialism [8](1. attacked 2. sponsored 3. installed) by the West.
How much truth is there in this grand opposition between Western and nonwestern civilizations on the subject of liberty and rights? I believe there is rather little sense in such a grand opposition. [9](1. Despite 2. Neither 3. Nor) the claims in favor of the specialness of “Asian values” by governmental spokesmen from Asia, nor the particular claims for the uniqueness of “Western values” by spokesmen from Europe and America can survive much historical examination.
In seeing Western civilization as the natural habitat of individual freedom and political democracy, there is a tendency to extrapolate backwards from the present. Values that the European Enlightenment and other recent developments since the eighteenth century [10](1. did make 2. have made 3.are made) common and widespread are often seen as part of the long-run Western heritage, experienced in the West over millennia. The concept of universal human rights in the broad general sense of entitlements of every human being is really a relatively new idea, [11](1. as being not 2. not to be 3. As never been) much found either in the ancient West or in ancient civilizations elsewhere.
There are, however, other ideas, [12](1. either 2. such as 3. of) the value of toleration or the importance of individual freedom, which have been advocated and defended for a long time, often for the selected few. For example, Aristotle’s writings on freedom and human flourishing provide good background material for the contemporary ideas of human rights. But there are other Western philosophers (Plato and St. Augustine, for example) whose preference for order and discipline over freedom was no less pronounced than Confucius’. [13](1. Also 2. Therefore 3. On the contrary), even those in the West who did emphasize the value of freedom did not, typically, see this as a right of all human beings. Aristotle’s exclusion of women and slaves is a good illustration of this no universality. The defenses of individual freedom in Western tradition did exist but took a limited form.
Do we find similar pronouncements in favor of individual freedom in non-Western traditions, particularly in Asia? The answer is emphatically yes. Confucius is not the only philosopher in Asia, not even in China. There is much variety in Asian intellectual traditions, and many writers did emphasize the importance of freedom and tolerance, and some even saw this as the entitlement of every human being. The language of freedom is very important, for example, in Buddhism, which originated and first flourished in South Asia and then spread to Southeast Asia and East Asia, including China, Japan, Korea, and Thailand. Even the [14](1. outline 2. layout 3.portrayal) of Confucius as a strict authoritarian is far from accurate. Confucius did believe in order, [15](1. and 2. so 3. but) he did not recommend blind loyalty to the ruler.
The so-called “Western values of freedom and liberty,” sometimes seen as an ancient Western inheritance, are not particularly [16](1.but uniquely 2. but proudly 3. nor exclusively) Western in their origins. Many of these values have taken their full form only over the [17](1. last 2. earlier 3. recent) few centuries. While we do find some anticipatory components in parts of the ancient Western traditions, there are other such anticipatory components in parts of nonwestern ancient traditions as well. On the particular subject of toleration, Plato and Confucius may be on a somewhat similar side, [18](1. such as 2. just as 3. thereby) Aristotle and Ashoka may be on another side. The need to acknowledge diversity applies not only between nations and cultures, but also within each nation and culture. In the anxiety to [19](1. write 2. take 3. put) adequate note of international diversity and cultural divergences, and the so-called differences between “Western civilization,”“Asian values,” “African culture, and so on, there is often a dramatic neglect of heterogeneity within each country and culture. “Nations” and “cultures” are not particularly good units to understand and analyze intellectual and political differences. Lines of division in commitments and skepticism do not run along national boundaries — they run at many different [20](1. speeds 2. faces 3. Levels). The rhetoric of cultures, with each “culture” seen in largely homogenized terms, can trouble us politically as well as intellectually.
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