慶應SFC 1995年 総合政策学部 英語 大問2 全文

 If rules are treated as fixed and non­controversial entities, then it becomes difficult to explain their origins. The problem is a particularly acute one for theorists applying the game metaphor. The difficulty of discussing the origins of games by applying the game metaphor is well illustrated by Michael Argyle’s article about the rules of social life. Argyle, having stated that “even the most fiercely competitive and aggressive games can only take place if both sides abide by the rules”, adds the comment that “rules are developed gradually, as cultural products, as ways of handling certain situations; they can be changed, but changes are slow.” These comments suggest that the formulation of rules is something which somehow evolves with [1] (1. observable changes 2. sluggish mystery 3. open arguments) almost as imperceptibly as biological evolution. Just as the experimental social psychologist can safely assume that the course of biological evolution is not going to be changed in the middle of an experiment, so the rule theorist can rest [2] ( 1. assured 2. debated 3. informed) that the rules of social life will not be subject to sudden and troublesome alterations. However, this tacit dismissal of the issue of rule formulation is based upon [3] (1. a misconception 2. a new assumption 3. a historical condition). The major Sports of the modern world, such as football, cricket, tennis, and rugby, do not owe their rules to a slow process of accumulation, stretching over centuries of folk custom. On the contrary, the nineteenth century [4] (1. reached 2. evolved 3.saw) an energetic burst of rulemaking. Some important studies in the sociology of sport have shown that this rulemaking occurred at specific times of social change. Moreover, it was predominantly confined to a particular class.

 Much of the early rule formation arose directly out of argumentation, for it had been necessary to develop more regular procedures for settling disputes. For example, the 1846 rules of rugby were [5] (1. complete 2. not exhaustive 3.closed) rules of procedure, covering all aspects of the sport, but, in point of fact, were little more than decisions of certain disputed points. Things were not settled once-and­for­all when the various self-appointed rule makers had codified their decisions into proper systems of rules. Disputes were still liable to arise, especially as tactics and styles developed. In fact, the administrators of all sports need to monitor the rules, in order to make certain that the delicate balances between attack and defense, between vigor and dullness, and so on, are maintained. If the authorities [6] (1. succeed in 2. tackle with 3. fail in) this task, the new developments, which are so necessary if a game is to continue to be interesting, can so easily upset the balances on which all sports depend. Within every sport there will be individuals or lobbies who will [7] (1. deny 2. announce 3. support) that the change would lead to improvement. The continual monitoring of rules ensures that the process of rule formulation is never ended.

 If rule-following is a necessary prerequisite on the field of play, one might say that the existence of such rules implies an off field structure to permit the alternation of rules amidst argument and debate. In fact, the more rules a sport may have, the more arguments and changes of rules can be expected. Cricket is probably the most ornate of all sports, demanding that the players [8] (1. break 2. question 3. obey) both the formal rules and informal spirit of the game. Not a season passes without the games officials arguing amongst themselves about changing rules. In fact controversies on the pitch can end up in the [9] (1. committee rooms 2. on­the­field fights 3. new rules) as controversies about the appropriateness of rules. This is certainly true of the most furious, and enduring, of cricket’s on­the­field controversies. On the tour of Australia in 1932/3, the English bowlers adopted a tactic which the Australian team and public considered to be unfairly dangerous. The arguments stretched from the field of play right up to the highest levels of government. As with Socrates and Protagoras, the words used in the dispute would not keep agreeably [10] (1. open 2. still 3. conflicting), but the choice of terms became a matter of controversy in itself, as well as being a signal of the speakers sympathies. The British preferred to call their bowling tactic by the neutral, even academic, name of ‘Leg Theory’, [11] ( 1. in case 2. even if 3. as if) nothing more than strategy were involved. The Australians insisted on Bodyline to express their indignation with a ploy which they felt to be unsparingly intimidator. What is significant is that the controversy led to a change in the rules of cricket, and that the merits of this change [12] (1. occasion 2. discontinue 3.discourage) arguments to this day amongst the legislators of the game.

 There is a general point which does not concern the details of that unhappy cricket tour, and which is not even restricted to the world of sport. The [13] (1. more specific 2. more ambiguous 3. wider) issue is the close connection between lawmaking and argumentation. Laws may exist to resolve disputes, but they are created out of dispute, frequently at the cost of provoking further Argument. A simple syllogism might illustrate this: if there are lawyers, there will be arguments; therefore, if there are laws, there will be arguments. This same general point is better expressed in Plato’s Republic, which looked forward to the creation of a well-ordered state. The citizenry of this ideal republic would obey the states rationally founded laws without dispute. Such a perfect state, in the interests of maintaining its ordered harmony, would need to [14] (1. dispense with 2. formulate 3. abide by) laws about trivia such as contracts made in the market and contracts for manufacture, questions of slander and assault, the lodging of legal actions and empaneling of juries, exaction and payment of market or harbor dues and the general business of regulating business and police and harbor charges and other similar matters. If laws were formulated on such minor matters, then the citizenry would waste their whole time making and correcting detailed regulations, with the result that harmonious order would [15] (1. naturally follow 2. never be achieved 3. often be guaranteed). Sextons Empirics blamed the rhetoricians, rather than the existence of laws, for argumentation. He noted that among the barbarians there were no rhetoricians, and the laws remained unaltered and generally obeyed, whereas amongst those who cultivate rhetoric they are altered daily, as is the case with the Athenians. We could add that the “barbarians” Sextus Empiricus had in mind would not have codified their laws with the precision of the legislative bodies presiding over modern bat and ball games.

 The close links between rules and arguments can be illustrated by considering a culture which has formalized its rules of everyday behavior to an unequalled extent. The Talmud, containing the rules of Orthodox Judaism, specifies in detail what correct actions for every aspect of daily life are. Even the most trivial action must be performed in a sanctified manner to prevent godlessness from [16] (1. entering into 2. ruling over 3. opening up) everyday routines. The novelist Jorge Luis Borges, in his story The Zahir, describes the Talmud as having “codified every conceivable human eventuality.” This is [17] (1. an accurate description 2. a general conclusion 3. an exaggerated description), for the continuation of Talmudic debates shows that the complete codification is unattained but aimed for. The Talmud represents a self-produced anthropology, explaining to orthodox Jews the meaning of their rituals in a detail which the professional anthropologist, seeking the unwritten rules of social life, can only admire. Just as the behavior of game players is meaningless without knowledge of the rules of the game, so the customs of orthodox Jews are incomprehensible without the Talmud. However, this great code of behavior, which seeks to leave [18] (1. nothing to chance 2. a lot to be desired 3. much room to debate) but dictates detailed rule following, is principally a record of arguments. From its opening page, through its sixty or so volumes of tractates, it describes the arguments of the ancient rabbis, as they disputed their interpretations of the Holy Law. Every pronouncement is a subject of argument, and, as Heiman has shown in his account of modern Talmudic study groups, even today the Orthodox learn the rules by [19] ( 1. abandoning 2. reliving 3.authorizing) the ancient arguments. All in all, the Talmud represents not merely one of the most detailed codes of behavior ever produced, but is also one of the greatest collections of arguments in literature.

 Because arguments are such a constant theme in the history of social rules, their psychological importance should be recognized. However, psychologists will be unable to give due attention to argumentation as long as they employ theoretical frameworks which subtract the argumentative aspects from human activities. If this point is accepted, then we now have our excuse to [20] (1. leave 2. emphasize 3. construct) modern theory, and to enter the ramshackle old city center of rhetoric: it is in ancient rhetoric, but not in recent social psychology, that argumentation is placed in the center of human affairs. Consequently, the antiquarian psychologist is able to offer a justification for temporarily closing the modern psychology books, and for opening the texts of the ancient rhetorical tradition.




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