It is a mistake to think that power consists of just ordering others to change. You can affect their behavior by shaping their preferences [31](1. so 2. in ways 3. such) that produce what you want rather than relying on carrots and sticks to change their behavior when “push comes to shove.” Sometimes you can get the outcomes you want without pushing or shoving. Ignoring this dimension by using too narrow a definition of power can lead to a poorly shaped foreign policy. In my opinion, there are three aspects of power.
The first aspect, or “face,” of power was defined by Yale political scientist Robert Dahl in studies of New Haven in the 1950s, and it is widely used today [32](1. even though 2. as long as 3. so that) it covers only part of power behavior. This face of power focuses on the ability to get others to act in ways that are [33](1. in favor of 2. similar to 3. contrary to) their initial preferences and strategies. To measure or judge power, you have to know how strong another person’s or nation’s initial preferences were and how much they were changed by [34](1. their 2. your 3. its) efforts. Coercion can be quite clear in a situation in which there appears to be some degree of choice. If a man holding a gun [35](1. on 2. with 3. about) you says, “Your money or your life,” you have some choice, but it is small and not consistent with your initial preferences.
In the 1960s, shortly after Dahl developed his widely accepted definition, political scientists Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz pointed out that Dahl’s definition [36](1. emphasized 2. added 3. missed) what they called the second face of power.” Dahl ignored the dimension of framing and agenda-setting. If ideas and institutions can be used to frame the agenda for action in a way that makes others’ preferences seem irrelevant or [37] (1. to the end 2. without limit 3. out of bounds), then it may never be necessary to push or shove them. In other words, it may be possible to shape others’ preferences by [38](1. betraying 2. affecting 3. answering) their expectations of what is legitimate or feasible. Agenda-framing focuses on the ability to keep issues off the table.
Powerful actors can make sure that the less powerful are never invited to the table, or if they get there, the rules of the game have already been set by those who arrived first. International financial policy had this characteristic, at least before the crisis of 2008 [39](1. carried things over 2. took things in 3. opened things up) somewhat when the Group of 8 (G8) was supplemented by the Group of 20 (G20). Those who are subject to this second face of power may or may not be aware of it. If they accept the legitimacy of the institutions or the social discourse that framed the agenda, they may not feel unduly constrained by the second face of power. But if the agenda of action is [40](1. contrary to 2. constrained by 3. immune to) threats of coercion or promises of payments, then it is just an instance of the first face of power. The target’s acquiescence in the legitimacy of the agenda is what makes this face of power co-optive and partly constitutive of soft power—the ability to get what you want by the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction.
Still later, in the 1970s, sociologist Steven Lukes pointed out that ideas and beliefs also help shape others’ initial preferences. In Dahl’s approach, I can exercise power over you by getting you to do what you would [41](1. otherwise 2. publicly 3. involuntarily) not want to do; in other words, by changing your situation, I can make you change your preferred strategy. But I can also exercise power over you by determining your very wants. I can shape your basic or initial preferences, not merely change the situation in a way that makes you change your strategy for achieving your preferences.
This dimension of power is missed by Dahl’s definition. A teenage boy may carefully choose a fashionable shirt to wear to school to attract a girl, but the teenager may not be aware that the reason the shirt is so fashionable is that a national retailer recently launched a major advertising campaign. Both his preference and that of the other teenagers [42](1. have been 2. should have been 3. had been being) formed by an unseen actor who has shaped the structure of preferences. If you can get others to want the same outcomes that you want, it will not be necessary to [43](1. analyze 2. follow 3. override) their initial desires. Lukes called this the “third face of power.”
There are critical questions of voluntarism in determining how freely people choose their preferences. Not all soft power looks so soft to outside critics. In some extreme cases, it is difficult to ascertain what constitutes voluntary formation of preferences. For instance, in the “Stockholm syndrome,” victims of kidnapping who suffered traumatic stress begin to identify with their abductors. But in some situations, it is more difficult to be certain of others’ interests. Are Afghan women [44](1. depressed 2. impressed 3. oppressed) when they choose to wear a burka? What about women who choose to wear a veil in democratic France? Sometimes it is difficult to know the extent of voluntarism from mere outward appearances. To the extent that force creates a sense of awe that attracts others, it can be an indirect source of co-optive power, but if the force is directly coercive, then it is simply an instance of the first face of power.
Some theorists have called these the public, hidden, and invisible faces of power, [45](1. reflecting 2. maximizing 3. increasing) the degrees of difficulty that the target has in discovering the source of power. The second and third faces embody aspects of structural power. A structure is simply an arrangement of all the parts of a whole. Humans [46](1. make up for 2. are embedded in 3. keep out of) complex structures of culture, social relations, and power that affect and constrain them. A person’s field of action is delimited by actors with whom he has no interaction or communication, by actions distant in time and space, by actions of which he is, in no explicit sense, the target.” Some exercises of power reflect the intentional decisions of particular actors, whereas others are the product of unintended consequences and large social forces.
In global politics, some goals that states seek are more [47](1. susceptible to 2. valuable to 3. comfortable with) the second and third than to the first face of power. Amold Wolfers once distinguished between what he called “possession goals”—specific and often tangible objectives–and “milieu goals,” which are often structural and intangible. For example, access to resources or a trade agreement is a possession goal, whereas promoting an open trade system, free markets, democracy, or human rights is a milieu goal. Focusing solely on [48] (1. command power 2. intangible power 3. social power), the first face of power, may mislead us about how to promote such goals.
The reason not to collapse all three faces of power into the first is that doing so diminishes attention to networks, which are an important type of structural power in the twenty-first century. Networks are becoming increasingly important in an information age, and positioning in social networks can be an important power resource. For example, in a hub-and-spokes network, power can derive from being the hub of communication. If you communicate with your other friends through me, that gives me power. If the points [49](1. at the front 2. in the domain 3. on the rim) are not directly connected to each other, their dependence on communication through the hub can shape their agenda. Political theorist Hannah Arendt once said that “power springs up among men when they act together.” Similarly, a state can [50](1. devise 2. wield 3. lodge) global power by engaging and acting together with other states, not merely acting against them.
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